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Abstract-- The goal of this work is to establish basic data and 
techniques to enable safeguards appropriate to a new generation 
of nuclear power systems that will be based on fast spectrum 
reactors and mixed actinide fuels containing significant 
quantities of “minor” actinides, possibly due to reprocessing, and 
determination of what new radiation signatures and parameters 
need to be considered.  The research effort focuses on several 
problems associated with the use of fuel having significantly 
different actinide inventories that current practice and on the 
development of innovative techniques using new radiation 
signatures and other parameters useful for safeguards and 
monitoring.  In addition, the development of new distinctive 
radiation signatures as an aid in controlling proliferation of 
nuclear materials has parallel applications to support Gen-IV 
and current advanced fuel cycle initiative (AFCI) goals as well as 
the anticipated Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). 
Index terms- Fuel Processing, Advanced fuel Cycle, 
Nonproliferation
I. INTRODUCTION
he safeguards regime must be applied to any processing 
of nuclear materials for either separation and 
transmutation (S&T) performed as either part of a 
nuclear power program, processing and disposal of material as 
waste, or simply the control of special nuclear materials to 
prevent diversion or use in a nuclear weapons program.  The 
traditional elements of safeguards with material accountancy 
and containment and surveillance are the key to safeguarding 
an S&T operation, but these elements are generally specific to 
a given facility.  The technical safeguards means are keyed to 
particular measurements or specific parameters that are 
identified as being important and sometimes critical to verify 
specific items, accountancy, or characteristics important to the 
verification of operational declarations.  Radiation signatures 
that are used for such technical measurements are the interest 
of this work.  There will be some discussion of current 
technical means used in safeguards operations as they will be 
applied to the new situations to be encountered in 
safeguarding nuclear materials processing efforts with regards 
to S&T. 
Various processing systems will be discussed with regard to 
how radiation signatures are affected by the different methods.  
Particular attention will be given to PUREX, UREX, (in its 
several forms) and pyroprocessing as described under the 
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) program of Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL, Now part of the Idaho National Laboratory 
or INL).  These systems will not be presented in detail except 
for the outputs of the processes.  These systems have been 
presented in the literature and that detail will not be repeated 
here.  The light water reactor (LWR) fuel will be used as the 
model for processing as there are well documented 
compositions of this spent fuel and the processed output.  
Some fairly generic composition will be used for evaluation of 
radiation signatures and existing safeguard measurement 
systems. 
As examples of safeguards systems in current use, the IAEA 
techniques and equipment list will be used as these are 
operating systems and these systems will be discussed as 
general approaches, but not vendor specific equipment.  This 
is not to exclude development of other systems as this is part 
of the reason to look for radiation signatures for processed 
material.  This is done to restrict the discussion to more 
concrete situations and not launch into program of all new 
equipment.  As stated the emphasis is on radiation signatures 
and as such are presented there will be some discussion of 
how such signatures can be measured and what information 
they would provide. 
T
The current proposals to employ S&T involve both 
processing and recycling of plutonium and other actinide 
materials in an actinide burner of some form.  Exactly how 
this is to be done is critical to a safeguards effort that must be 
applied to this process.  In all proposals that are either 
currently in use or being proposed, the presence of the 
actinides heavier than uranium become more important as the 
neptunium, americium, curium and californium isotopes play 
a major radiological role in safeguarding the plutonium to 
insure there is not diversion in some way to a weapons 
program or other undesirable uses of the material.  The exact 
radiological signatures that can be used in safeguards 
verification and monitoring measurements are the subject of 
this study.   
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Figure 1. Actinides produced as a result of separation and transmutation processes. 
241for this work.  In addition, there are discrepancies for some of 
the fission product yields in model calculations that need to be 
resolved by the experimental data. 
Am and its products into the mix in significant quantities.  
The assumption is that these and some other actinide isotopes 
are to be the ones of concern for safeguards measurements 
with a cycle of multiple processing and irradiation.  As to 
actual quantities of material produced there is substantial 
variation of both plutonium and other actinides in light water 
reactor (LWR) fuel due to initial enrichment, burnup, and data 
used in the analysis of spent fuel.  The plutonium quantities 
vary from 0.6 % to 0.2 % of the units of heavy metal with the 
other actinides being from 1.0 % to 1.5 % of the plutonium 
mass [4]. 
II. ACTINIDE ISOTOPES
A key question is what are the plutonium and other 
materials that are to be considered as a product of the 
production and processing?  This question is also affected by 
what processing system will be used, and the source of the 
spent fuel to be processed.  For S&T multiple pass processing 
and irradiation is assumed and this makes the determination of 
relative quantities and ratios of material difficult.  A simple 
calculation of irradiation and burnup for a thermal neutron 
spectrum results in the isotopes seen in Figure 1[1]. These 
calculations used neutron fluxes from 10
Table in Appendix A lists the actinides and their relevant 
characteristics used in this work.  The isotopes indicated by an 
"*" have too short a half live to be important  in a separation 
system but they are important as a path for production of 
longer lived actinides during irradiation.  The table list 20 
actinides that have a half life greater than 10 years, 
13n/cm2/s to 
1016n/cm2/s. 249Bk is 
only nine years, and significant radiation signatures.  These 
will be the basis of discussion.  Appendix A also gives the Į-
and E-particle decay chains these actinides will be discussed a 
signatures for identifying and quantifying these actinides in 
the processed output.   
Figure 1 shows 33 isotopes including the uranium isotopes.  
Some references have as many as 51 isotopes [2] while others 
have as few as few as 20 [3]. For the case of processing, the 
short lived isotopes are not to be considered as they will decay 
significantly during cooling times and will not become 
important in the processing output.  In general, the isotopes 
with a half-life greater than one year will be included for 
consideration as a safeguards issue.  Also, the short lived 
isotopes are included as they are important in production of 
other isotopes during irradiation.  For the cases of S&T the 
decay of 
III. FUEL PROCESSING SYSTEMS
 Processing of spent nuclear fuel is currently being done in 
France and the United Kingdom using the PUREX [5] 
process.  This is a well established process and safeguards 241Pu becomes important for the introduction of 
procedures, as applied to PUREX and its installations, are 
well understood and have been developed to a very high 
degree.  A key point to the output of the PUREX system is 
that the materials that are to be safeguarded, the plutonium, is 
very pure and free from contaminates from other actinides.  
For radiological measurements to verify the plutonium, this 
makes the task somewhat simpler than for a mixed processing 
output.  The safeguard measures for a PUREX process will 
not be discussed here. 
New processing systems are being researched and 
developed under the AFCI program [6] with the goal of 
reducing the cost and complexity of processing and tailoring 
the output streams to facilitate the problems concerned with 
the nuclear waste and the geological repository.  These fall 
into the categories of aqueous and non-aqueous systems.  The 
aqueous systems are generally based on the UREX and 
PUREX processes with simplification and cost reduction with 
the output streams tailored to specific needs of storage and 
transmutation.  The aqueous process that will be discussed 
here is UREX+ [7,8] and its variations. 
For non-aqueous processing the focus of this work will be 
on pyroprocessing [9,10] as developed by ANL in the IFR 
program.  Pyroprocessing is not a continuous process but 
operates on batches of fuel in an electrochemical cell that is a 
LiCl bath operated at 650°C.  Oxygen is liberated in the 
process and the reduced metals are collected in the cathode 
basket. This basket becomes the anode in the next step, where 
uranium is extracted by an electrorefining process.  The 
metallic uranium is deposited on a cathode, and the uranium is 
recovered by melting at reduced pressure to volatilize off any 
adhering LiCl. The transuranic elements, and all but the noble 
metal fission products, are dissolved in the electrorefining 
process and remain in the LiCl electrolyte salt.  The 
transuranics (and a quantity of the remaining uranium) can be 
recovered in a liquid cadmium cathode, collecting about 3-5 
kg of TRU elements per batch.  Alternatively, an 
electrowinning process could be used to extract the 
transuranics after the electrorefining step to recover uranium.  
There are other details and variations of this process but they 
will not be covered here the focus is on what are the output 
and the uncertainties in mass of the different outputs that are 
important to safeguards. 
a) UREX+ Process 
At this time the AFCI program is proposing the UREX+ 
processing in several variations for SNF.  Table I lists the 
UREX+ process and identifies the different outputs from each 
variant.  The reason for the different forms of UREX+ is 
determined by the different uses of the output streams and 
how they are to be handled for disposal.  The removal of the 
uranium, technetium and iodine, cesium and strontium, and 
transuranics is an effort to maximize space in the geological 
repository and reduce heat loading in the repository.  The 
uranium in SNF comprises about 96-97% of the mass of the 
fuel.  UREX+ process has the goal, and laboratory scale 
demonstrations have shown, [9,10] that uranium recovery is 
>90%, and its purity requirement will allow its waste disposal 
as low-level waste according to 10CFR61.55.  This is the 
criterion that the uranium contain less than 100 nCi/g of TRU.    
Separation of technetium and iodine allows transmutation of 
these two long lived isotopes and have the requirement that 
separation must be >95% with the technetium containing less 
than 16 ȝg of fissile actinides per g and the iodine output must 
contain less than 4 ȝg of fissile actinides per g.  Cesium and 
strontium are recovered at better than 97% and the purity 
requirement of 100 nCi/g of TRU content allows ultimate 
disposal as low-level waste at a later time.  Plutonium and 
neptunium recovery is >99%, and the purity is such that the 
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel specifications is met as described in 
ASTM C833-01.  The recovery of americium and curium is 
99.5% and the purity, and, based on fast-reactor recycle of all 
TRU, has a lanthanide content < 20 mg/g uranium plus TRU.  
All soluble fission products but Cs, Sr, Tc, I, and the rare 
earth elements are converted to a solid for disposal in the 
repository.  As stated this has been demonstrated on SNF at a 
laboratory scale. 
The simple picture of safeguards radiation signatures and 
measurements needed for UREX+ processing looks straight 
Table I.   A summary of the UREX+ processes characterized by the different outputs. 
Output Streams Process
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fission
ProductsUREX+1 U Tc-I Cs-Sr TRU-Ln
UREX+1a U Tc-I Cs-Sr TRU All Fission Products
Fission
ProductsUREX+2 U Tc-I Cs-Sr Pu-Np Am-Cm-Ln
UREX+3 U Tc-I Cs-Sr Pu-Np Am-Cm All Fission Products
All Fission 
ProductsUREX+4 U Tc-I Cs-Sr Pu-Np Am Cm 
forward but there are some issues that must be covered along 
with the differences between the situations with PUREX 
processing.  Both processes produce well separated outputs 
but the key difference between UREX+ and PUREX is the 
additional separation of key fission products, the purity of the 
uranium output and the plutonium and other actinides (TRU) 
in a mixed form.  The UREX+ process is predicted to be more 
economical than the PUREX with less waste but those are not 
of interest here.  The PUREX process produces separated 
plutonium for use in MOX fuel and the primary issue from a 
safeguards approach is the amount of plutonium and the 
isotopic ratio of the 239Pu/240Pu isotopes [11].  The PUREX 
plutonium output is of sufficient purity to be used in MOX 
fuel but it is not mixed with other actinides.  For UREX+1a, 
the presence of other actinides poses serious problems using 
gross radiation measurements, for both neutron and gamma 
ray.  For situations where mass spectroscopy can be used 
these mixtures should not be a problem but for radiation 
verification measurements even using high resolution gamma-
ray spectroscopy, these mixtures present a challenge to a 
standard approach. 
For the UREX+2, 3, and 4 processes, some of the same 
problems exist for the plutonium/neptunium output as the 
simple plutonium isotopic ratio measurements are complicated 
by the presence of the neptunium.  Using low-energy x-ray 
analysis becomes more difficult due to the presence of 
elements separated by only one Z following Į-particle decay.  
With presence of 241Pu in SNF with long cooling times, the 
241Am presence further complicates this elemental 
measurement.  For the case of high burnup fuel, even with the 
separation of the plutonium/neptunium output with >99% 
efficiency from the other actinides, this present significant 
problems due to the high specific activity of the other 
actinides as compared to the plutonium and neptunium (See 
Appendix A).  In some cases the specific activity for the 
americium and curium isotopes are more than two orders of 
magnitude higher than that of the 239Pu making the 1% or so 
contamination be the dominate component on a radiological 
measurement.  Even with the differences in mass in the 
fractions that are present in the spent fuel, this small 
contamination can be problematic.  The ratios of the isotopes 
will be discussed later but with recycling through either 
LWRs or fast reactors for the TRU and plutonium, the mass 
ratios become more disadvantageous. 
a) Pyroprocessing 
Although there are several non-aqueous spent fuel 
processing systems, the one to be considered her is the 
pyroprocessing method developed by ANL for the IFR 
program.  For the pyroprocessing an electrorefiner process 
Table II. Pyroprocessing of different types of reactor fuels (model calculations).
Composition At Reactor Discharge (g / kg spent fuel) After Pyroprocessing (g / Kg Metal)
Source IFR BWR JPDR IFR BWR JPDR
GWd/MTU 18.96 2.71 18.96 2.71
U234 3.17E-02 1.96E-01 1.47E-01 1.25E-02 7.46E-02 6.04E-02
U235 9.33E-01 1.38E+01 2.30E+01 5.78E-01 5.23E+00 9.44E+00
U236 1.71E-01 3.04E+00 6.92E-01 6.76E-02 1.15E+00 2.84E-01
U238 7.75E+02 9.75E+02 9.74E+02 3.88E+02 3.73E+02 4.00E+02
U237 2.33E-07 9.20E-08
Pu238 1.40E+00 3.02E-04 3.85E+00 1.33E-01
Pu239 1.67E+02 4.32E+00 1.23E+00 4.60E+02 4.21E+02 5.44E+02
Pu240 4.47E+01 1.41E+00 7.64E-02 1.23E+02 1.37E+02 3.37E+01
Pu241 4.77E+00 3.93E-01 8.50E-03 1.31E+01 3.83E+01 3.75E+00
Pu242 1.90E+00 1.14E-03 1.93E-04 5.23E+00 1.11E-01 8.54E-02
Pu236 1.37E-05 3.77E-05
Np237 1.38E+00 1.82E-01 3.42E+00 1.60E+01
Am241 1.55E+00 1.75E-01 1.82E-03 2.85E+00 1.14E+01 5.39E-01
Am242m 1.14E-01 2.10E-01
Cm242 7.96E-02 1.13E-07 1.18E-01 2.71E-05
Cm244 1.78E-01 1.55E-03 5.82E-08 2.64E-01 8.14E-02 1.39E-05
Am243 3.89E-01 7.16E-01
Cm243 4.32E-03 3.76E-05 6.40E-03 1.98E-03
Cm245 3.65E-02 5.41E-02
Cm246 1.06E-02 1.57E-02
model [12] has been used to estimate the composition of the 
pyroprocessing product for IFR spent fuel.  For efficient TRU 
extraction in the pyroprocessing, the electrorefiner requires a 
ratio of plutonium to uranium (Pu:U) above three.  For this 
processing we used an electrorefiner process model to 
estimate the composition of the pyroprocessing product for 
IFR spent fuel as well as several thermal reactor types spent 
fuel with different burn up.  Table II shows the results of some 
of the the estimated product composition for IFR, BWR, and 
JPDR fuels.  As shown in Table II, Uranium recovery from 
processing 96 kg of IFR spent fuel with the composition [3], 
will achieve a Pu/U ratio in the electrorefiner of 3.35.  Using a 
liquid cadmium cathode for TRU extraction, the estimated 
product composition for IFR spent fuel is shown in this Table.   
Unlike the UREX+ or PUREX process, pyroprocessing has 
considerable uncertainties in both the separation of each 
output and the total amount of material processed because 
some material is held in the salt bath until the salt is recovered 
after several batches have been processed.  The uncertainty in 
the estimation, per element, is shown in Table III.  These high 
uncertainties indicate that a better method like radiation 
signatures is needed to achieve less than 5% accuracy.  Also, 
using the radiation signatures enable us to measure uncertainty 
for each individual isotope. 
Mass spectroscopy can establish purities of the different 
material with very high accuracy but radiological analysis will 
require high resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy with different 
data reduction from the conventional methods used for current 
MOX fuels.  Tables II also present the situation that exists for 
the IFR case on both the fuel at discharge and after 
processing.  Unlike the LWR spent fuel composition that can 
be found from direct analysis of spent nuclear fuel over the 
past decades, [13] there are few cases of spent fuel analysis 
for fast reactors.  Table II will be relevant for discussion of 
radiological measurements for safeguarding processed fast 
reactor fuel.  For the situation in which fuel is processed and 
then recycled in a fast reactor as an actinide burner, this is the 
only information on post irradiation composition except for 
complex models of the reactor cores that are being developed.  
The IFR case has the advantage of being benchmarked against 
some destructive analysis.   
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Both policy and well as technical decisions will determine 
the processing methods used and the composition of the 
different outputs of the different methods.  Regarding 
radiological signatures, possible addition of highly radioactive 
isotopes like the lanthanides with the outputs of the UREX+1 
or UREX+2 processes greatly complicate verification 
measurements used in safeguards.  The presence of the 
lanthanides also raises problems for the use of the actinide 
materials as fuel in either fast reactors or in LWRs as actinide 
burners.  The mixing of actinides into one output stream, or 
even two, create measurement problems due to the broad 
range of specific activities of the different actinide isotopes.  
This particularly affects gross radiation measurements on a 
finished fuel form.  The amount of material to be measured at 
one time greatly affects the ability to measure radiological 
signatures.  In the case where samples can be taken, as during 
a processing step, the problems of high activity can be 
mitigated by a small sample size but overall sensitivity to 
mixed materials may not be helped.  Obviously mass 
spectrometry in several forms will be used in a processing 
facility, but radiological measurements will be needed 
particularly when samples cannot be taken or there is 
movement of finished material between material balance 
areas.  With multiple processing plans and different output 
possibilities, no one radiological signature or technique will 
probably suffice.  Several cases with explicit conditions of the 
process outputs will need to be considered.  
Table III. Calculated pyroprocessing errors.  The model 
does not calculate the uncertainty for each isotopes. 
Element 
Future work involves (a) Identify the basic parameters of 
the measurements that are needed; (b) Determine the exact 
effect of the contributions of different uncertainties; (c) 
Comparing the expected performance with the results of 
actual measurements of well-known amount of materials as 
well as with the model calculations; and (d) If possible, other 
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Np237 2140000 y 2.63581 7.03E-04 1.00
Np238* 2.117 d 2.79000 2.59E+05 1.00
Np239* 2.355 d 2.66180 2.32E+05 1.00
Pu238 87.69992 y 2.89471 1.71E+01 1.00 1.86E-09 3.414E+03
Pu239 24113.5 y 2.87777 6.22E-02 0.9994 3.10E-12 2.052E-02
Pu240 6536 y 2.78391 2.27E-01 1.00 5.70E-08 1.331E+03
Pu241 14.33029 y 2.93130 1.03E+02 0.999975 2.46E-05
Pu242 373509 y 2.85950 3.95E-03 1.00 5.50E-06 2.296E+03
Pu243* 4.956 h 3.01000 2.60E+06 1.00
Pu244 80001800 y 2.82000 1.81E-05 0.99875 1.25E-03 2.365E+03
Am241 432.80832 y 3.23879 3.43E+00 1.00 4.30E-12 1.769E+00
Am242* 16.04 h 3.36000 8.08E+05 0.832 0.168
Am242m 141.00296 y 3.26400 1.05E+01 0.99537 to GS 0.00463 1.60E-10 2.026E+02
Am243 7370.01 y 3.27283 1.99E-01 1.00 3.70E-11 8.937E-01
Am244* 10.1 h 3.15180 1.27E+06 1.00
Am244m* 26 min 3.15180 2.97E+07 E+ 0.000361; 
E- 0.999639 
Cm242* 162.93056 d 3.44000 3.32E+03 1.00 6.10E-08 2.581E+07
Cm243 28.5 y 3.43201 5.05E+01 0.0024 0.9976
Cm244 18.00039 y 3.46000 8.08E+01 0.99999 1.38E-06 1.428E+07
Cm245 8500.19 y 3.59640 1.72E-01 1.00
Cm246 4730.09 y 3.61416 3.08E-01 0.99973 2.61E-04 1.077E+07
Cm247 16000400 y 3.58000 9.51E-05 1.00
Cm248 340008 y 3.12960 4.24E-03 0.9174 0.0826 4.059E+07
Cm249* 1.06917 h 3.34880 1.18E+07 1.00
Bk247 1360 y 3.50670 1.05E+00 1.00
Bk248 9.00018 y 1.60E+02
Bk248m* 23.7 hr 5.32E+05 E+ 0.3; E- 0.7 
Bk249* 320 d 3.34640 1.64E+03 0.999986 1.45E-05 4.69E-10 9.511E+04
Bk250* 3.217 h 3.57200 3.89E+06 1.00
Cf248* 333.5 d 1.58E+03 1.00
Cf249 351.00694 y 3.88690 4.08E+00 1.00 5.20E-09 3.052E+03
Cf250 13.08027 y 3.63000 1.09E+02 0.99923 7.70E-04 1.129E+10
Cf251 898.01839 y 4.14000 1.58E+00 1.00
Cf252 2.64505 y 4.06000 5.35E+02 0.96908 3.09E-02 2.486E+12
Cf253* 17.81 d 4.15000 2.89E+04 0.9969 0.00310
Es253* 20.47 d 2.52E+04 1.00 8.70E-08
